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Abstract H. G. Wells’ Time Traveller inhabits uniform Newtonian time. Where
relativistic/quantum travelers into the past follow spacetime curvatures, past-bound
Wellsians must reverse their direction of travel relative to absolute time. William Grey
and Robin Le Poidevin claim reversing Wellsians must overlap with themselves or
fade away piecemeal like the Cheshire Cat. Self-overlap is physically impossible but
‘Cheshire Cat’ fades destroy Wellsians’ causal continuity and breed bizarre fusions of
traveler-stages with opposed time-directions. However, Wellsians who rotate in higher-
dimensional space can reverse temporal direction without self-overlap, Cheshire Cats
or mereological monstrosities. Alas, hyper-rotation in Newtonian space poses dynamic
and biological problems, (e.g. gravitational/electrostatic singularities and catastrophic
blood-loss). Controllable and survivable Wellsian travel needs topologically-variable
spaces. Newtonian space, not Newtonian time, is Wellsians’ real enemy.
Keywords Time travel · Dimensionality · Incongruence
1 Introduction
Physical travelers into the past must be Gödelians or Wellsians. The former follow
spacetime curvatures; the latter reverse temporal direction relative to absolute time.1
Newtonian and relativistic physics seemingly forbid Gödelians and Wellsians respec-
tively. Can absolute time admit backward time travel or is curved spacetime required?
1 After (respectively) Gödel (1949), Wells (1895)—see also Earman (1995: pp. 160–163).
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Grey (1999), Le Poidevin (2005) claim reversing extended Wellsians must overlap
with themselves or fade away piecemeal like the Cheshire Cat. Either way, traveler-
continuity fails and Wellsian reversals are physically impossible.
However, Wellsians have options besides self-overlap or fades, which reveal sur-
prising links between time travel, spatial topology and biology. Pace Grey (1999),
Le Poidevin (2005), absolute-time travel is possible if space is sufficiently accom-
modating. Wellsians can reverse without discontinuity or overlap if they rotate
in higher-dimensional space. However, rotation in Newtonian hyperspace is nei-
ther (humanly) controllable nor survivable. Controllable, survivable Wellsian travel
requires dynamic, variable-topology spaces. Wellsian time can be Newtonian, abso-
lute and uniform; Wellsian space cannot. Wellsian travel requires that space itself be
plastic.
2 Lewisian time travel
Time travel has been variously defined but David Lewis (1976: p. 145) defined it best:
Inevitably, it involves discrepancy between time and time. Any traveler departs
and then arrives at his destination; the time elapsed from departure to arrival
(positive, or perhaps zero) is the duration of the journey. But if he is a time
traveler, the separation in time between departure and arrival does not equal the
duration of the journey.
Discrepancies separate external and personal time. External time is time in a suitably-
inclusive reference frame. (E.g. a galaxy’s center of mass.) Personal time is traveler-
time, not a “further temporal dimension, but rather the way in which time is registered
by a given object: a heart beating, hair growing, a minute hand moving, a candle
burning”, (Le Poidevin 2005: p. 339). Travelers’ memories, watches, digestion, (etc.)
register personal time but none individually constitutes it. (Watch malfunctions or
hibernation are not time travel.) Time travel affects everything in travelers’ reference
frames.
Following Lewis (1976), traveler identity and personal time require correct causal
continuity between traveler-stages, and dissolve if inter-stage continuity fails. What-
ever their relations to external time, genuine travelers are personal continuants:
For time travel requires personal identity—he who arrives must be the same
person who departed. That requires causal continuity, in which causation runs
from earlier to later stages in the order of personal time (Lewis 1976: p. 148).
If the usual causal connections underlying traveler-identity and personal time fail en
route, the process isn’t travel. Stages of genuine travelers are not joined merely by (e.g.)
coincidental likenesses, spatiotemporal proximity or accidentally-shared purposes,
howsoever close.2 Inter-stage qualitative similarity alone cannot make just any stage-
aggregate into a traveler if correct inter-stage causal links are lacking:
2 Nor can they be joined solely by copying—which at least is a causal relationship but not of the right kind.
Cf. Lewis (1976: p. 148) on ‘counterfeit time travel’ achieved via (demon-managed) copying.
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… What unites the stages (or segments) of a time traveler is the same sort
of mental, or mostly mental, continuity and connectedness that unites anyone
else. The only difference is that whereas a common person is connected and
continuous with respect to external time, the time traveler is connected and
continuous only with respect to his own personal time (Ibid.).
Furthermore, if travelers are normal concrete things, their constitutive links should
be spatiotemporally local. Any process that requires spatiotemporally discontinuous
inter-stage links arguably does not involve bona fide travel. This papers argues that
extended Wellsians cannot maintain correct inter-stage causal links (and hence per-
sonal time) unless space has extra dimensions or (preferably) variable structure.
3 Gödelians and Wellsians
Wells (1895) has a thoroughly Newtonian background. Newtonian space and time are
mutually independent, eternal substances. Newtonian time is absolute and uniform—
passing everywhere in the same direction, at the same rate. Newtonian worlds as a
whole possess unambiguous time functions and absolute simultaneity, i.e. have a uni-
versal ‘now’. In relativity, space and time are not independent existents but twin aspects
of spacetime. General relativity predicts matter’s presence affects spacetime itself and
allows time (in effect) to ‘curve’. Gödel (1949) describes spacetimes so curved as
to allow ‘closed timelike curves’ (CTCs): journeys that are always (locally) future-
directed yet eventually rendezvous with their own spatiotemporal starting points. Parts
of Gödel universes (e.g. galaxies) can have well-defined time-functions but Gödel
universes in toto cannot: they have no universal ‘now’. (Simultaneity relations can-
not be defined for their entirety.) Gödel universes neither begin nor end but simply
are: infinite, four-dimensional blocks with strange geometrical ‘twists’ that let trav-
elers visit any (externally) earlier or later times. Wellsians take peculiar journeys
in otherwise conventional universes; Gödelians are otherwise conventional travelers
in strangely-structured spacetimes. Wellsians actively go against time’s local flow;
Gödelians passively follow time’s local direction. (Wellsians resemble helicopters in
a uniform breeze; Gödelians, balloons in a cyclone.) In effect, Gödelians merely per-
sist in idiosyncratic directions. Gödelians thus don’t much resemble time travelers in
fiction, who can generally go anywhere in history. Indeed, some (notably Le Poidevin
2005) think Gödelians’ relative lack of room for maneuver means they cannot gen-
uinely time-travel. If so, problems for Wellsians doom physical time travel.
Newtonian worlds are temporally well-behaved. Gödel (1949) universes have CTCs
through every point. CTCs have well-defined past and future directions locally (in the
traveler’s vicinity) but not globally (viewed as a whole). Gödelians can re-encounter
their own pasts by traveling into their local future. Past and future are only relatively
distinct on CTCs, rather as ‘up’ and ‘down’ are not absolute distinctions but relative
to the Earth’s center. (Similarly, clock-faces have well-defined clockwise and anti-
clockwise directions at every point yet a sufficiently prolonged clockwise journey
revisits its starting point.) Reversing direction against external time gives Wellsian
travel clear start- and end-points. Such reversals present the problems which are the


















Fig. 1 Gödelian and Wellsian
ties show up only for the whole journey: “In Gödel’s space-time the local temporal and
causal order will not differ from the one we are familiar with in our world; deviations
can only occur for global distances”, (Pfarr 1981: p. 1090, emphasis original).
Wells (1895) features no processes recognized by relativity. Relativistic time travel
(time dilation or CTCs) requires movement and/or gravitational differences between
personal and external reference frames. However, Wells’ (1895) Traveller sits at rest
(relative to the Earth) with his personal time varying in direction and/or rate of travel
relative to all surrounding objects. Everything outside Wells’ (1895) machine registers
one external time, while the machine enjoys a unique personal time without motion
or gravitational differences relative to its surroundings. During backward time-travel,
Wells’ (1895) Traveller sees everything outside the Machine seemingly go into reverse.
Unlike Wellsians, Gödelians see no apparent failures of entropy (or other temporal
anomalies) in their immediate extra-vehicular surroundings. Wellsian travel requires
locally and globally backward causation; Gödel travel requires only the latter.
Below are depicted one Gödelian and seven Wellsians in various one-dimensional
and two-dimensional spaces, (‘Linelands’ and ‘Flatlands’ respectively).3 All illus-
trations have one time-dimension.4 Wellsian(a) is an unextended (point-like) object
which reverses temporal direction twice (first at φ and then at ω) but otherwise persists
normally (Fig. 1).
External time increases and personal time decreases ω-to-φ. Each personal moment
holds one Wellsian. Each external moment ω-to-φ (e.g. m1) holds three Wellsians, the
midmost growing younger as external time increases. Viewed externally, two Wellsians
seem to converge on φ and disappear, while two seemingly appear ex nihilo at ω and
diverge. If these phases form parts of one history, physical continuity (and personal
time) must survive φ and ω—otherwise, they are three separate objects and not one
continuant. Wellsian round-trips require both φ-style and ω-style reversals. Wells’
(1895) Traveller departs from/returns to external times around 10 am and 7.30 pm
respectively on one day early in 1894. Meantime, he spends eight personal days visiting
3 After the linear and planar kingdoms in Abbott (1884). See also Rucker (1986: p. 19 ff).
4 Le Poidevin (2005: pp. 340–342) discounts extra temporal dimensions as solutions for double occupancy
and follows Lewis (1976: p. 145) in doubting that travel in multi-dimensional time is genuine time travel.
Cf. Richmond (2000): pp. 269–270.
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Fig. 2 Double occupancy
802,701 AD and then c. thirty million AD. He presumably reverses φ-style leaving
the future and then ω-style re-entering 1894.5
Wellsian reversals seem temporally peculiar but spatially benign—at least for unex-
tended objects. However, extended Wellsians risk overlapping later and earlier selves.
What Grey (1999: pp. 60–61) baptizes double occupancy looms pre-φ and post-ω,
with “not one but two machines—one going backwards and the other forwards—
each apparently occupying (or attempting to occupy) the same location”. Wellsians
face identical difficulties at φ-style ‘apex-instants’ or ω-style ‘nadir-instants’—it’s
changing direction that poses problems. Can extended concrete objects make such
transitions?
Dowe (2000: p. 446) suggests reversing Wellsians avoid self-overlap if they also
move in space: “To do this sort of time travel you have to take a run up”. Passers-by
might see a departing Wellsian machine “moving across a field, and … its reversed
later self moving towards it (perhaps an antimatter time machine, perhaps not)”, until
“the two collide, apparently annihilating both”, (ibid., emphasis added). However, as
Le Poidevin (2005: p. 344) shows and Fig. 2 illustrates, movement during reversal still
leaves some overlap inevitable. (At least movement at finite velocity. Infinite velocity,
even if coherent, threatens discontinuous existence or multiple overlapping stages.)
Moving is not enough.
Stationary Wellsian(b) reverses once at t2 so two copies overlap completely at every
moment shown. Co-occupancy is more localized and transitory for moving Wellsian(c).
The leading and trailing edges of Wellsian(c) are ‘B’ and ‘A’ respectively. In external
time, two of Wellsian(c) first meet at t1, when the forward phase’s edge B meets the
backward phase’s edge A. These two Wellsians(c) then progressively overlap until
they coincide at t2 and vanish thereafter. Wellsians(b,c) are extended objects which
multiply occupy the same spaces for extended periods. If one Wellsian can’t exclude
another from its space t1 − t2, is it still concrete at such times? Genuine solutions to
double occupancy must at least let Wellsians behave like concrete objects that have
continuous histories.
5 For probable dates, times and durations of the Traveller’s adventures, see Geduld 1987: p. 40, 48 and 94
n. 14. In discarded 1894 drafts, the Traveller overshoots on his journey home, lands first in a prehistoric
swamp and then nearly gets shot as a warlock on New Year’s Eve 1645, (ibid. pp. 187–188).
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Time travelers who are Gödelian, unextended or spatiotemporally discontinuous
all evade double occupancy. Likewise, diverse tropes, universals, fields or sortals6
can co-occupy. However, “two [concrete] objects of the same kind (persons, chairs,
iron spheres)”, (Le Poidevin 2005: pp. 336–337) cannot co-occupy. Napoleon and
his dress-sense can co-occupy but Napoleon and Wellington cannot, and nor can two
Napoleons.
Interestingly, Le Poidevin (2005: p. 350) thinks backward time travel should be
something travelers do (or initiate), and should proceed against time’s global direction:
It is, I think, a moot point whether simply following a closed time-like curve in
worlds where there is no global earlier-later direction constitutes genuine time-
travel. Arguably, time travel is something that, as we might put it, goes against
the grain of space-time, rather than simply following it.
If Gödelians are mere slaves of curved spacetimes (with no global time direction to
buck), only Wellsians could truly time-travel. (For similar sentiments, see Torretti
1999: p. 79, n. 20.) Even Gödel thought Gödelians weren’t strictly time travelers. He
thought the possibility of CTCs proved that dynamic time has no objective analogue,
therefore our temporal experience tracks only an ‘ideal’ (apparent or non-objective)
time and relativity’s ‘t’ co-ordinate is not truly timelike. (See Yourgrau 1999). Hence
a dilemma: without global time, Gödelians can’t time-travel; Wellsians could (per
impossibile) time-travel but spatial problems (e.g. co-occupancy) foil them.
But must time travel be Wellsian? Lewis’s (1976) necessary and sufficient condition
for time travel, i.e. discrepancy between external and personal time-registers, covers
Wellsian and Gödelian alike. Lewis (1976) defines time travel by outcomes, not topolo-
gies or methods, and leaves unspecified how discrepancies arise. Pace Gödel, suppose a
wormhole takes your (apparent) personal history from 2045 to execution for witchcraft
in 1645. If so, being told you hadn’t really time-traveled (and/or time is ideal) seems
cold comfort. However, Le Poidevin (2005) raises relevant issues even if Gödelians
truly time-travel. Gödel universes may lack universal times but other relativistic mod-
els permit them.7 If future physics restores global times, only Wellsian travel remains.
Sections 1–3 surveyed Lewisian time travel, Gödelian/Wellsian differences and dou-
ble occupancy. Next, Sect. 4 differentiates double occupancy from bilocation and
persistence problems. Sections 5–11 outline and refine candidate answers to double
occupancy.
4 Two things double occupancy is not
(1) Bilocation bilocated time-travelers occupy two distinct places at the same external
time and look like two different people, with different personal ages. Bilocation arises
if (e.g.) a traveler meets her earlier self. However, double-occupying objects multiply
occupy the same place at the same external time. Wellsians or Gödelians can bilocate
6 Cf. the co-occupying (but sortally distinct) ‘Lumpl’ the clay and ‘Goliath’ the statue in Gibbard (1975).
7 See e.g. Bourne (2006: pp. 160–203). Even Gödel’s universe loses its (otherwise ubiquitous) CTCs if
modeled in string theory. Cf. Barrow and Da˛browski (1998).
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but only Wellsians double-occupy. Spatially stationary Wellsians co-occupy without
bilocation. Time travelers who meet but don’t overlap with themselves bilocate without
co-occupancy. Wellsian(b) only co-occupies; Wellsian(c) co-occupies and bilocates.
(2) A persistence problem the two chief philosophies of persistence, endurantism
and perdurantism, characterize co-occupancy differently but neither evades it, (cf. Le
Poidevin 2005: pp. 337–338). For endurantists, persisting objects are wholly present
at a time; for perdurantists, objects extend across time. Endurantism implies Wellsians
must wholly and simultaneously occupy the same space more than once. Perdurantism
implies distinct temporal parts of Wellsians must co-occupy. Either way, each temporal
part (or version) is a spatially-extended concretum with its own associated mass and
shape.
Note Wellsians’ spatial problems are not truly solved by letting Wellsians (e.g.):
• exist discontinuously in space or time,
• become impalpable, abstract or ghostly,
• have identity-conditions supervening on non-causal facts,
• utilize some form of (quasi-Newtonian or quantum) nonlocality,
• have different haecceities for forward- and backward-travelling phases,
• lack well-defined spatial relations with other simultaneously-existing objects,
• bear different (temporal parts of) instantiation relations to identical regions etc.
All such exotica seem ad hoc. Worse, they simply grant (Grey 1999; Le Poidevin
2005) that reversing Wellsians can’t behave like classical concrete objects. Wellsians’
problems are spatial and only spatial solutions appear herein. To summarize the prob-
lem:
• At most one (stage or version of a) concrete object of a given kind can occupy an
extended spatial region at a time.
• Reversing Wellsians change temporal direction relative to their surroundings.
• Wellsians are spatiotemporally-continuous extended concrete objects.
Following sections aim to show that these attributes are jointly achievable but that
no proper solution to Wellsian problems has appeared hitherto. Sections 5–6 criticize
previous solutions. Sections 7–9 explore new, if unsuccessful, solutions. Adapting
Sect. 8 ‘hyperspace’ model, Sects. 10, 11 propose a true solution involving altering
space itself.
5 Wells on double occupancy
Wells himself variously considered co-occupancy—albeit between travelers and other
objects, and not between different stages/versions of travelers. Wells (1895) compares
time travelers whizzing through history at different ‘speeds’ to objects crossing space at
differing speeds (see Le Poidevin 2005: pp. 338–340). Wellsians who traverse (e.g.) 50
external seconds per personal second travel 50 times ‘faster’ and make 1/50th of their
‘stationary’ impression compared to normally-persisting objects, just as bullets make
attenuated visual impressions to observers they pass. However, stationary observers
see past speeding bullets and not through them, i.e. derive visual impressions primarily
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from whichever background the passing bullets briefly obscure. An observer who co-
moves with a bullet should see it obscure its background just like any other object.
Similarly, anybody shot will find high velocity exacerbates bullets’ impact rather than
diminishes it. Why should perceptual attenuation make objects less present at places
they occupy? Physical presence is the problem, not perception of it.
Wells’ (1894) serial version of The Time Machine at least treats co-occupancy
physically as well as perceptually. Once Wells’ (1894) ‘Philosophical Inventor’ has
described traveling to and from A.D. 12,203, one of his auditors asks why no future
people noticed him while he occupied the same (relative) place for millennia. At first,
the Inventor waxes analogical in reply, invoking perception like his (1895) successor:
Suppose, for instance, you put some red pigment on a sheet of paper, it excites
a certain visual sensation, does it not? Now halve the amount of pigment, the
sensation diminishes. Halve it again, the impression of red is still weaker. Con-
tinue the process. Clearly there will always be some pigment left, but a time will
speedily arrive when the eye will refuse to follow the dilution, when the stimulus
will be insufficient to excite the sensation of red. The presentation of red pig-
ment to the senses is then said to be “below the threshold.” Similarly my rapid
passage through time, traversing a day in a minute fraction of a second, diluted
the stimulus I offered to the perception of these excellent people of futurity …
(Geduld 1987: p. 159)
Note Wells’ (1894) Inventor glosses machine ‘speed’ using personal/external time:
in ‘rapid passage’, fractional personal seconds encompass external days. Conceding
the perceptual point (maybe prematurely), the questioner then raises physical co-
occupancy:
I suppose while you were slipping thus invisibly through the ages, people walked
about in the space you occupied. They may have pulled down your house about
your head and built a brick wall in your substance. And yet, you know, it is
generally believed that two bodies cannot occupy the same space (Geduld 1987:
p. 159).
Here, the Philosophical Inventor replies with a non sequitur about molecular diffusion:
Don’t you know that every body, solid, liquid, or gaseous, is made up of molecules
with empty spaces between them? That leaves plenty of room to slip through
a brick wall, if you only have momentum enough. A slight rise of temperature
would be all one would notice and of course if the wall lasted too long and the
warmth became uncomfortable one could shift the apparatus a little in space and
get out of the inconvenience (Ibid.).
But varying personal/external time shouldn’t mitigate spatial co-occupancy. Why
can’t any solids interpenetrate given sufficient relative momentum? Anyway, gas-
molecules slipping through membranes move relative to whatever they permeate;
Wells’ machines hold stationary relative to any co-occupied objects. Interpenetra-
tion is nothing to the purpose: gaseous diffusion never involves multiple extended
concreta simultaneously occupying numerically the same space. (Anyway, as Wells’
1894/95 travelers can see external events, neither is really impalpable while traveling.)
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Fig. 3 Cheshire Cat
While Wells’ attempts fail, other options have been proposed. Section 6 surveys Le
Poidevin’s (2005) suggestions, whereby reversing Wellsians perforce disintegrate (and
re-integrate) en route. While Le Poidevin (2005) is clear that such solutions themselves
fail, his critique is instructive.
6 Cheshire Cats and chimeras
Le Poidevin (2005: p. 345 ff.) suggests Wellsians can avoid self-overlap by depart-
ing ‘Cheshire Cat’ fashion, each part having a separate departure-time. Wellsian(d)
departs piecemeal: edge B leaves at t1 and edge A at t2. Self-overlap is avoided
because each part reverses at a different apex-instant. However, the need to main-
tain continuity makes travelers’ forward and backward phases peculiarly contiguous.
Henceforth fusions of contiguous temporally-opposed masses are ‘chimeras’ and two-
headed chimeras ‘Pushmi-Pullyus’.8 Above right, a reversing astronaut’s two phases
meet toe-to-toe at t1 and fuse without overlap. Nearing t2, our astronaut’s remains have
dwindled to two contiguous copies of a scalp. This twin-scalped chimera diminishes
until vanishing at t2 (Fig. 3).
Chimeras and Pushmi-Pullyus can last arbitrarily long, depending on their parent
phases’ size and velocity. Traveler-orientation determines chimeras’ shape. (Their
phases needn’t be mirror-images, e.g. if travelers rotate while reversing.) Head-first
travelers vanish feet-last, their headless chimeras “too horrible to contemplate”, (Le
Poidevin 2005: p. 346). A four-limbed, back-first, traveler yields four chimeras—one
per limb. Whither the traveler in this four-way fission? That traveler identity could
supervene purely on said traveler’s scalp seems implausible but still more so is a
traveler surviving for unspecified periods as four spatially-disjoint objects, (none of
them containing a brain). Can physical travelers who lack brains have psychological
states?
Wellsian(c) departs in one piece at t2. Wellsian(d) has no clear departure-time: its
front (B) reverses at t1 and its back (A) at t2. Wellsian(d) is all gone by t2 but t2 isn’t
8 After the antelope with a head at each end in Lofting (1920). Dramatizations often portray the Pushmi-
Pullyu as a bicephalous llama.
123
Synthese
Fig. 4 ‘Push’ aymmetry
the departure-time. Continuity and identity fail if Wellsians and their spatial parts
cannot attend all external times in their careers: “How can something continue to exist
if there are (external) times when only a spatial part of it does so?”, (Le Poidevin
2005: p. 345). Cheshire Cat fades destroy travelers and are not mere interludes in their
careers. ‘Cheshire Cat’ solutions must let all a Wellsian’s spatial parts visit all times
in its career and retain normal causal powers. Travel shouldn’t oblige travelers to shed
themselves.
Co-occupancy, Cheshire Cats and chimeras all imperil personal time. For the Janus-
like Pushmi-Pullyu at t1, t2 is in its left head’s personal future but its right head’s
personal past—it also registers t1 twice in experience (once per head) and once in
memory (right head only). However, if Cheshire Cats destroy traveler-identity, personal
time fails for Pushmi-Pullyus and memories don’t survive head-to-head.
Chimeras have problematic personal time even if causal links survive Cheshire Cat
fades. Figure 4 left-hand traveler is pushed rightward at t1. All its personally subsequent
stages are displaced rightward, whether externally later or earlier. Figure 4 right-hand
traveler is pushed leftward at t1. This push affects only externally-earlier stages with
t1 twice in their personal past. Leftward pushing has direct effects externally later and
earlier; rightward pushing has direct effects only externally earlier. When the leftmost
traveler revisits t1, where it re-intersects t1 is largely determined by influences exerted
at that very (external) time. Even if causal continuity survives reversal, chimeras
allow effectively instantaneous causal transmission along a timeslice and hence their
inter-stage causal connections aren’t linearly ordered even in personal time, (cf. Le
Poidevin 2005, p. 348). So phases of Cheshire Cats can’t comprise genuine travelers
because they lack correct inter-stage links. However, chimeras’ contiguous masses
can’t comprise genuine travelers either because of their surfeit of inter-stage links.
Again, traveler-identity requires that “causation runs from earlier to later stages in the
order of personal time,” (Lewis 1976: p. 148).
Mereological universalists9 think that any sum of temporal parts composes an object
but yet insist that genuinely salient continuants only fall under certain sortals (e.g.
9 E.g. “I claim that mereological composition is unrestricted: any old class of things has a mereological
sum”, Lewis (1986: p. 211).
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‘person’) and embody correct causal links. Mereological universalism alone can’t
save Wellsians because chimeras’ salience-criteria are problematic and their personal
time ill-ordered. Fusions of causally-disjoint stages are not persons even if made of
persons. The Cheshire Cat diachronic question is ‘When does this thing depart?’; the
Pushmi-Pullyu synchronic questions are ‘What is this thing?’ and ‘Is this one thing?’.
Also, electrostatic problems loom as chimera-phases get arbitrarily close together:
How close do the series get to each other? The answer is that they actually make
contact, before converging on a single temporal part. This is genuine contact, not
the mere close proximity that passes for contact in everyday situations. The sub-
atomic structure of matter imposes limits on how close atoms can get to each
other. But [a reversing Wellsian] transcends those limits (Le Poidevin 2005:
p. 349).
A reversing hydrogen atom would see its two phases’ nuclei fuse into a single pro-
ton while their electronic orbits overlap. Discrete (i.e. only finitely-decomposable)
space might alleviate unphysical proximity but Newtonian space is supposed to be
continuous. ‘Forward’ charged particles should repel their own ‘backward’ coun-
terparts if they retain constant charge through reversal. Coulomb’s inverse-square
law implies arbitrarily-small separations of like charges require unbounded energy:
their mutual repulsion blows up arbitrarily as their separation approaches zero. The
closer they get, the harder getting them any closer becomes and the more readily they
spring apart. Fusing like charges strictly governed by Coulomb’s law is physically
prohibitive.
What if a reversing particle’s phases have opposite charges? Famously, Wheeler–
Feynman theory says “positrons can be represented as electrons with proper time
reversed relative to true time”.10 If so, the two phases’ charged particles attract their
opposite numbers but their backward-traveling phases are antimatter. In which case,
oppositely-directed phases cannot form chimeras without mutual annihilation. (As
Grey (1999: p. 62) notes, Wheeler–Feynman reversals should be highly energetic.)
An electrostatic dilemma: reversing constant charges requires unbounded energy but
reversing opposed charges threatens mutual annihilation. Physics aside, logic for-
bids mutual annihilation between an object’s earlier and later phases. An earlier
phase can destroy a later without inconsistency. However, a later phase destroying an
earlier yields a ‘Grandfather’ (strictly ‘Autoinfanticide’) Paradox. At least Wheeler–
Feynman theory suggests how Wellsian reversal might occur: if backward-matter is
antimatter, inverting a particle’s charge should induce Wellsian reversal. However, it
remains unclear what could switch charges or reverse uncharged particles. (Section 10
revisits and addresses Wheeler–Feynman issues for Wellsians.) Clearly, appeals to
motion, perception, interpenetration or disintegration alone cannot solve double occu-
pancy. Section 7 considers new ‘solutions’, wherein travelers can radically change
shape.
10 Feynman (1949): p. 753, n. 7. What Feynman calls ‘proper’ and ‘true’ time are effectively Lewisian
personal and external time respectively.
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Fig. 5 Singularity (T/x plane)
Fig. 6 Singularity (x-plane)
7 Singularity Wellsians
Sections 2–6 suggest some lessons: To avoid co-occupancy and chimeras, Wellsians’
stages must never overlap or form contiguous masses. To avoid Cheshire Cats, all a
Wellsian’s spatial parts should be able to visit all external times in its career. Sec-
tions 7–11 consider new therapies for co-occupancy, Cheshire Cats and chimeras.
Those of Sect. 7 involve radical shape-changes and arbitrarily-dense matter. Those of
Sections 8–11 allow constant shape and density but require extra spatial dimensions
(Sects. 8, 9) or variable topology (Sects. 10, 11). Wellsians(a−c) reverse intact while
Wellsian(d) decomposes into particles. Spatially two-dimensional Wellsian(e) begins
circular but drastically changes shape: its x-extremities (A, B) get arbitrarily close
and its z-extremities (C, D) arbitrarily separated at t1. Wellsian(e)’s cross-section is
ill-defined at t1 but otherwise constant (Figs. 5, 6).
All of Wellsian(e) registers completely at least once on every global timeslice. Its
phases also only meet along a line—so no overlapping parts, Cheshire Cat fades or
chimeras.
Problem solved? Alas, no: consider what happens at t1. Completely avoiding over-
lap while keeping cross-sectional area constant drives Wellsian(e) towards nil length
and unbounded breadth at t1: Wellsian(e)’s shrinking towards nil x-length must com-
pensatingly drive it towards unbounded size in the y-direction. So Wellsian(f) must go
from finite area and breadth to (effectively) zero area and infinite breadth, and back
again, in finite time. Since Newtonian physics sets no theoretical limit on how fast
objects can travel, at least Newtonian spacetimes permit the arbitrarily-large velocities
such ‘Singularity’ Wellsians need. However, letting parts of Singularity Wellsians pro-
ceed to (and from) arbitrary distances arbitrarily fast also needs remarkable scarcity
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of other objects around t1 if catastrophic collisions are to be avoided. If Wellsian(f)’s
cross-sectional area can vary arbitrarily, then at least its z-extremities can be finitely
far apart traveling through t1. Even so, Wellsian(f) still hits a linear singularity of zero
area and unbounded density at t1.
One help for ‘Singularity’ solutions is that Newtonian physics allows arbitrarily-
divisible matter. However, can objects survive being compressed to infinitesimal
length? Real matter has sharply differentiated structure at sub-atomic, atomic and
molecular levels. ‘Infinitesimal’ stages of Singularity Wellsians must have compo-
nents arbitrarily smaller than (e.g.) any electron. If no physical structure survives
reversal, causal continuity fails and Wellsian(f)’s forward/backward phases are distinct
continuants. Also, as Singularity Wellsians become arbitrarily dense around t1, their
resulting runaway gravitation should make them ‘dark stars’: classical bodies whose
gravitation is so intense no physical object traveling slower than light can escape from
their vicinity.11 Such Wellsians would be invisible to outside observers when reversing
but have large gravitational effects on their surroundings. A dilemma looms: restoring
‘dark star’ travelers to finite density/size after reversal seems difficult even if their
causal continuity survives the ‘Singularity’, but double occupancy recurs if any finite
x-extension survives through t1. Neither option makes ‘Singularities’ survivable.
Coulomb’s law poses problems here too: arbitrarily-compressing multiple like
charges requires unbounded energy. (Although electrostatic repulsion might explain
how arbitrarily-compressed travelers regain normal size post-reversal.) Preserving
Wellsians’ causal continuity requires more than spatiotemporal proximity and con-
tinuity for their parts. (Parts of exploding objects retain continuous trajectories yet
being exploded destroys objects nonetheless.) Bouncing through (n − 1)-dimensional
singularities would destroy n-dimensional Wellsians. Cheshire Cat solutions cannot
merely let each Wellsian-part have a continuous trajectory; Wellsians (and their parts)
must also retain:
(1) Presence on all global times in their histories,
(2) Finite size and density,
(3) Continuous trajectories,
(4) Constant shape.
Singularity Wellsians can observe (1) while their parts can observe (1) and (3). But nei-
ther Singularity Wellsians nor their parts can observe (2) or (4). ‘Singularity’ solutions
fail. Section 8 considers a better option: allowing Wellsian space extra dimensions.
8 Hyper-rotation
While unsuccessful, Singularity solutions have instructive features, e.g. phases
meeting along a frontier with one fewer dimension than their surrounding space.
Wellsian(d)’s leading edge is B in forward travel but A in backward. So Wellsian(d)
also changes chirality; its phases incongruent counterparts. Double-occupancy and
Singularity Wellsians maintain congruency but Cheshire Cats resemble another Well-
11 Dark stars were first discussed in Reverend John Michell’s letter to Henry Cavendish, see Michell (1784).
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Fig. 7 Hyper-rotation in T/x plane
sian protagonist, that of Wells’ (1896) ‘The Plattner Story’.12 A mysterious explosive
blows schoolmaster Plattner into another realm, where he spends 9 days before drop-
ping back into earthly life. On return, Plattner’s body has seemingly swapped left and
right sides. As rotation in (n+)-dimensions makes orientable n-dimensional shapes
non-orientable, Wells’ (1896) narrator wonders if Plattner has been rotated in four-
dimensional space.
Abbott’s (1884) two-dimensional protagonist, ‘A. Square’, visits one-dimensional
Lineland in a dream. A. Square imagines trying to persuade Lineland’s King that
Flatland exists by speaking to His Linear Majesty from His insides. Lindgren and
Banchoff (2010: p. 135) suggest a better demonstration, i.e. A. Square ‘Plattnerizing’
Lineland’s King by rotating His Linear Majesty through 180◦ in Flatland. (Lineland’s
King has two voices, bass and tenor, one at each end. Hyper-rotating the King should
make His tenor voice emanate whence His bass voice came and vice versa.)
If Cheshire Cat phases form a single continuant (and so merely change chirality
rather than lose identity), their constituent causal connections must survive. Plattner’s
alteration involves only spatial movement, i.e. no time travel occurs and no instant
holds multiple Plattners or Plattner-stages. Plattner’s chirality alters but his causal
continuity survives. What if Wellsians can also rotate Plattner-fashion? Wellsian(f)
from a Newtonian ‘Lineland’ reverses in time while rotating in (x − z) Flatland
‘hyperspace’.13 Wellsian(f) rotates through 90◦ t1-to-t2 and (personally later) rotates
another 90◦ t2-to-t1. At t2, Wellsian(f) is instantaneously orthogonal to Lineland.
Hyper-rotation also ‘Plattnerizes’ Wellsian(f), making forward and backward phases
into enantiomorphic counterparts (Figs. 7, 8).
Wellsian(f) starts rotating at t1 but begins backward travel (en bloc) at t2. As
rotation begins, Wellsian(f) seems to dwindle to a point, apparently leaving only a
dimensionless cross-section of itself in Lineland. (Likewise hyper-rotating Flatlanders
should present linear cross-sections to Flatland observers and hyper-rotating three-
dimensional travelers in turn should leave planar cross-sections in Spaceland.) All
12 Discussed in Lindgren and Banchoff (2010: p. 153). Lindgren and Banchoff (2010: p. 171) also discuss
Abbott (1884) as a source for Wells’ fourth-dimensional interests. For more on Plattner and time, see
Richmond (2000).
13 While this paper was in progress, a very interesting, rather different, set of spatial solutions to double
occupancy (et al.) were proposed in Bernstein (2015), especially 3.1 (‘Personal Space and External Space’,
pp. 165–166). One difference between this paper and Bernstein (2015) is the focus herein on how much of
Newtonian space can be preserved in allowing Wellsian reversals; if the arguments herein work, Bernstein’s
(2015) ‘personal spaces’ must have certain features (e.g. be dynamic and non-uniform) if Wellsians’ spatial
problems are not to resurface in personal space. While nothing herein aims to criticise Bernstein (2015),
this paper might help explore how such ‘personal spaces’ could (or should) be structured.
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Fig. 8 Hyper-rotation in x/z plane
such hyper-rotating travelers would appear to lose a spatial dimension when viewed
from within their native spaces.
However, unlike Singularity Wellsians’ genuine dimension-loss, these snap-fades
and dimensional losses are only apparent. In (x − z) Flatland, Wellsian(f) retains
constant extension and shape. Wellsian(f) has nil x-extension when its phases meet
at t2 so no parts overlap and yet all its spatial parts register (in their correct relative
places) on every global time-slice. A rotational Wellsian’s stage-sum has one more
spatial dimension than any individual stage; n-dimensional Wellsians forming (n+)-
dimensional stage-aggregates. Each stage has a unique spatiotemporal location without
co-occupancy, Cheshire Cats, chimeras, shape-changes or runaway density. Rotating
Wellsians change chirality when reversing but otherwise maintain continuity. Hyper-
rotation meets all four desiderata for Cheshire Cat solutions while avoiding unphysical
proximity (and electron overlap) without finitely-sized spatial atoms. It isn’t clear
how electromagnetic fields from an n-dimensional object would propagate if that
object were translated into (n+)-dimensional space. However, at least if n-dimensional
charges generate n-dimensional charge-fronts and Wellsians’ phases meet obliquely
in (n+)-space, then their phases don’t overlap ‘field-to-field’. (Consider how two
planes that meet obliquely in three dimensions will overlap only at a line and not at a
surface.) Hyper-rotating travelers’ phases will only meet at apex-instants and along an
axis where they are themselves extensionless. Apex-instants hold only one traveler-
stage and hence threaten no multiple contiguous or overlapping stages. Hyper-rotation
allows Wellsians sufficient physical continuity for their personal time to be defined
without ambiguity or circularity.
Apex instants have ancestors and (distinct) successors at externally-earlier times.
But what temporal directions have travelers at apex instants? Presumably, forward
or backward yet there seems no basis to assign either. Does hyper-rotation make a
single traveler-stage (instantaneously) temporally bidirectional and dissolve double
occupancy only to yield paradox? Not necessarily: apex instants can be finessed by
adapting ‘at-at’ theories of motion often invoked to address Zeno’s ‘Arrow’ and ‘Sta-
dium’. ‘At-at’ theories of motion can treat instantaneous velocities as ill-defined or as
limit-values; instantaneous temporal directions could be treated likewise.
Wellsians approaching apex instants occupy certain places at certain times. Their
personal and external time increase during approach. They then occupy certain places
at apex instants. Personally thereafter (but earlier externally), they occupy other places.
If travelers lose well-defined time-directions at instants where they also cease bilo-
cation, this isn’t necessarily problematic. If Wellsians exhibit neither bilocation nor
chimeras at apex instants, where might a physical basis for attributing opposed time-
directions reside? Perhaps reversing Wellsians have well-defined time-directions over
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any finite period but lack time-direction at an (apex or other) instant. Regardless of
what happens at apex-instants, co-occupancy and chimeras yield multiple phases with
opposed time-directions which (respectively) overlap or fuse for extended periods.
‘At-at’ views of time-direction alone won’t banish double occupancy. Even if (e.g.)
Wellsian(c) has one temporally directionless stage at t2, its phases protractedly overlap
approaching t2.
Hyper-rotation means Wellsians’ forward and backward phases join via a single
spatially-complete phase which instantaneously lacks time-direction. (Nowhere do
oppositely-oriented phases overlap or fuse over extended periods.) If time is con-
tinuous, there will be no well-defined last instant where two stages exist but apex
instants can still be defined, i.e. as instants whose causal ancestors and (distinct)
causal successors occupy numerically the same externally earlier times. Apex instants
are junctures between externally-increasing and externally-decreasing times, visited
in that personal order; nadir instants are junctures between externally-decreasing and
externally-increasing times, visited in that personal order. The best joint spatial therapy
thus far for co-occupancy, Cheshire Cats and chimeras involves reversing Wellsians
simultaneously moving and rotating out of local space. Is Wellsian travel saved? Well,
progress has been made but, as Sect. 9 shows, hyper-rotation seems little real help
if (e.g.) rotation is uncontrollable and/or only available to non-living things. Only
Sects. 10, 11 truly dissolve Wellsians’ problems.
9 Dynamic and biological hyper-rotation problems
Even if hyper-rotation avoids co-occupancy and chimeras, new problems arise. How
might n-dimensional objects rotate/translate into (n+)-dimensional space? In Wells
(1896), the explosion of a mysterious powder triggers Plattner’s rotation but how a
(presumably) 3-space explosive could rotate Plattner through one more dimension
than the explosive itself enjoys seems unclear. If the explosive changes Plattner’s
momentum orthogonally to the direction of any exerted force, it violates Newton’s
second law. But if the explosive is spatially four-dimensional, Plattner can only handle
an infinitesimal cross-section of its true hyperspatial extent. It’s also unclear how the
explosive makes Plattner rotate, since any hyperspatial blast-front centered in, and
propagated through, 3-space would push Plattner through his center of gravity. Maybe
Plattner’s transition is dynamically possible if the explosive impinges on him obliquely
from outside 3-space. Perhaps something four-dimensional ‘peels’ Plattner from 3-
space, spins him through 180◦ in 3-space about an area (i.e. not an axis) internal to him
and then drops him back into 3-space as his own earlier self’s enantiomorph. However,
Platter (like any 3-space creature) seems powerless to initiate or control ‘hyperspatial’
(4-space) journeys.
Likewise in Abbott (1884), rather than lower-dimensional spaces pushing their
occupants forth into hyperspace, higher-dimensional creatures reach down and abstract
creatures from lower-dimensional spaces. (A visiting Sphere translates Abbot’s
Square into 3-dimensional Spaceland.) If hyper-rotation requires help from higher-
dimensional life, controllable travel for n-dimensional Wellsians requires not only
the existence of, but communications with, amenable (n+)-dimensional beings.
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Spacelanders could assist Flatlanders (or Linelanders), and Flatlanders could assist
Linelanders, but no realm can facilitate Wellsian travel for its indigenous life unas-
sisted.
Spaces with (n > 3) are usually thought possible. However, James van Cleve
disagrees: “for my part, the intuition that three mutually perpendicular lines leave no
room for a fourth, or that a sphere intercepts all paths from inside to outside, is as
compelling as the intuition that red excludes blue from the same surface”.14 If so, the
maximally-dimensioned possible Wellsians are Flatlanders and humans are too ‘deep’
for hyper-rotation. Even allowing (n > 3) spaces, maybe only (n = 3) spaces permit
life, e.g. if (n = 3) spaces forbid functional nervous systems, digestive tracts or stable
planetary orbits. (Cf. Whitrow 1955.) If so, no (n = 3) life can help 3-space Wellsians
or receive their help.
How might n-dimensional objects interact in (n+)-dimensional spaces? Perhaps n-
dimensional objects seem insubstantial to (n+)-dimensional ones: “If the Flatlanders
are truly two-dimensional, with no thickness at all, then they will be as immaterial as
shadows or patches of light”, (Rucker 1986: p. 19). However, if n-dimensional objects
retain finite mass in (n+)-dimensions, n-dimensional bodies might strike other objects
like perfectly sharp blades or prove insusceptible to manipulation against a fixed (n+)-
dimensional spatial background. Rather than shadows, finite-mass Flatlanders might
resemble planar ‘dark stars’ in Spaceland. Likewise, Plattner or A. Square might
grievously slice or puncture anything they strike during their hyperspatial sojourns.
Hyper-rotating humans poses biological problems too. Enclosed (n)-dimensional
cavities become open in (n+)-dimensions. Hyper-rotating any enclosing vessel while
it translates whisks away the enclosure. Forces rotating human bodies in 4-space must
act orthogonally to (e.g.) van der Waals forces, contact forces and surface-adhesion
forces that normally hold those bodies’ fluid contents in. Travelers’ blood will tend
to retain its original state of motion and thus escape as all but a cross-section of its
containing vessels gets rotated into hyperspace. Hyper-rotated travelers would pre-
sumably die if they shed most, if not all, of their blood, breath, lymph, cerebrospinal
fluid etc. ‘Plattner’ hyper-rotation relative to (or out of) local space, i.e. travelers’
immediate surroundings, seems highly injurious to anything like anthropomorphic
life. (Assuming inter-molecular bonds cannot be extended at will, so each traveler
effectively becomes one giant molecule. However, this too would be disastrous for
life as we know it: a body formed of one giant molecule would be ill-equipped to
absorb nutrients and lose wastes.)
Could n-dimensional Wellsians avoid fluid-losses by traveling shielded by other n-
dimensional objects? Alas, keeping n-dimensional bodies completely fluid-tight using
n-dimensional shielding seems a tall order, since the bodies and shields seem obliged to
be perfectly contiguous, i.e. with no finite-sized gaps at all. (Imagine fluid-filled Flat-
landers rotating while sandwiched between two planar shields.) In any event, shielding
necessarily interposes other solid objects between traveler-phases, yielding another
kind of discontinuity. Hyper-rotation might be survivable for ‘solid-state’ Wellsians
14 van Cleve (1987): p. 64. Lindgren and Banchoff (2010: p. 232) claim Aristotle’s On The Heavens (268
ab) implies no (n > 3) space is possible by denying “the possibility of extending the derivation sequence
beyond the third dimension”.
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lacking fluid-filled cavities or Wellsians who upload their conscious functions onto
non-biological vehicles before rotation and retrieve them afterwards. (Maybe Well-
sians could rotate while cryogenically frozen—although freezing must completely
immobilize all their fluid contents, gaseous and liquid.) Even allowing (n > 3) spaces
(pace van Cleve 1987), hyper-rotated humans seem doomed to die and leave messy
residues behind. Section 10. shows how hyper-rotation can be controllable and sur-
vivable, inspired by William Kingdon Clifford (1886: p. 224 ff.) on spatial structure.
Only here are double occupancy and Cheshire Cat problems dissolved, and Wellsian
travel vindicated.
10 Cliffordian and neo-Cliffordian space
Cavity-filled n-dimensional objects open catastrophically if rotated/translated in flat
(n+)-dimensional spaces. What about more complex topologies? Suitable topologies
might let Wellsians take their local n-dimensional surroundings with them. Suppose
space is not uniform and immutable as Newton assumed but flexible, much as ‘rubber
sheet’ models of gravitation depict spacetime.
Newton accepted only separate, flat space and time. General relativity postulates
curved spacetime. However, William Kingdon Clifford (1845–1879) imagined locally-
curved spaces, intermediate between Newtonian space and Einsteinian spacetime.
Specifically, Clifford considered the dynamic implications of spatial curvature vary-
ing across places and times. Such spaces can also solve Wellsians’ problems. Inspired
by Riemann, Clifford wondered if local spatial curvatures cause apparent force phe-
nomena. Perhaps we treat “merely as physical variations effects which are really due to
changes in the curvature of our space; [perhaps] some or all of those causes which we
term physical may not be due to the geometrical construction of our space”, (Clifford
1886: p. 224). Cliffordian space and matter relate asymmetrically: topology dictates
matter-distribution but not vice versa. Adapting John Wheeler’s summary of general
relativity: Cliffordian space tells matter how to move, but matter cannot tell Cliffordian
space how to curve.15
Clifford also postulated that “degree of curvature may change as a whole with
the time [and] change of curvature might produce in space a succession of apparent
physical changes” (1886: p. 225). If n-dimensional space can bulge like a rubber
sheet, portions of it can (effectively) rotate in (n+)-dimensional space, carrying
traveler phases along with them so they meet without overlapping. Such Wellsians
wouldn’t rotate relative to local space but instead travel with local space as it ‘rotates’.
Wellsian(g)’s Lineland can form branch loops that smoothly diverge from, and recon-
nect with, their parent space.
15 Russell rejected variably-curved (e.g. Clifford) space as “logically unsound and impossible to know, and
therefore to be condemned à priori”, (1897), (1996 edition: p. 118). Later Russell ruefully admitted “The
geometry in Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity is such as I had declared to be impossible”, (Russell
1959), (1997 edition: p. 31). For Russell on Clifford, see (Nickerson and Griffin 2008). If Russell’s (1897)
argument worked, it would banish both Wellsian and Gödelian travel a priori but without invoking either
the ‘Grandfather Paradox’ or ‘causal loop’ objections definitively defused in Lewis (1976).
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Fig. 9 Topological looping
Points A1, B1, A′1 and B′1 all lie in Lineland. Extremities A and B intersect t1 at A1
and B1 when Wellsian(g) travels forward in time and at A′1 and B′1 when Wellsian(g)
travels backward. A2 and B2 are where extremities A and B lie at t2, i.e. the instant
when Wellsian(g) proceeds neither forward nor backward in time. A occupies A1,
A2 and A′1 in that personal order; B occupies B1, B2 and B′1 in that personal order.
Wellsian(g) effectively leaves Lineland at t1 then loops back to re-join Lineland at t1
in another place.
Wellsian(g) escapes both stage-overlap and Cheshire Cat fades but never changes
chirality or leaves its local linear space. (Figure 9 shows two space dimensions but
Wellsian(g) stays in its local linear space throughout.) Wellsian(g) need not even move,
but can merely persist forward t1-to-t2, and backward t2-to-t1. Given correct topol-
ogy (plus ability to move back in time), Wellsian(g) presents no dynamic, spatial or
biological difficulties. Figure 9 loop is only spatial – external time increases t1-to-t2
along both arms. What happens at t2? In external time, the loop ceases to exist or runs
out of space.
Wellsian(g)’s loop only exists for finite external time t1-to-t2, and only twice that
interval of personal time (i.e. t1-to-t2 then t2-to-t1). Wellsian(g)’s reversal needs precise
timing: if reversal begins (externally) before t2, Wellsian(g) double-occupies; however,
reversal later than t2 is impossible because the loop doesn’t exist (externally) later than
t2. If entered by an object unable to reverse temporal direction, the loop is a blind alley.
The need for ‘loops’ confines Wellsian travel to spaces where topologically-suitable
connections exist naturally or can be made. Newtonian space is independent of mat-
ter. It affects matter (e.g. dictating matter’s degrees of movement) but cannot be
affected by it. Newtonian space is multiply hostile to topological-rotation Wellsian
travel. Tridimensionality is neither necessary nor sufficient for space being Newto-
nian. However, Newtonian space is essentially time/matter-independent and flat. (See
e.g. Maudlin 1993.) Rotating Wellsians require either flat (n+)-dimensional space or
curved n-dimensional space. Varying curvature needs non-uniform space; creating
curvature needs mutable space. If space cannot be curved to order, Wellsian travel
needs pre-existing spatial curvatures. Wells’ (1895) Traveler can go anywhere in his-
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tory; Cliffordian Wellsians are restricted by available spatial curvatures and so stand
to space rather as Gödelians do to spacetime.
Clifford’s time-evolving, locally-curved space remains Newtonian qua being abso-
lute, unaffectable by matter and substantival. Letting space and matter-distribution
interact reciprocally comes closer to general relativity. Call matter-affectable, locally-
curved, absolute space ‘neo-Cliffordian’. Neo-Cliffordian spaces allow the local
topological (e.g. ‘loop’) connections requisite for survivable reversals. Such spaces
can also remain time-independent substances even if their structures vary over time.
(Neo-)Cliffordian time can remain Newtonian, i.e. uniform, independent of space and
matter, unaffectable by matter and (crucially) possessing global timeslices.
Controllable Wellsian travel needs plastic neo-Cliffordian spatial structure. Such
permits topological connections that let travelers rotate relative to global space but
retain constant orientation relative to their local space. This in turn requires suitably-
large (and enduring) curved regions that join smoothly to otherwise uniform space.
Given natural correctly-configured regions, Cliffordian universes could permit Well-
sian travel even if spatial structure was immune from human control. Admittedly
such regions would need to be comparatively common, accommodating and easy to
locate if Wellsian travel were to be easy, frequent or regular. Also, even given free
ingress/egress to topologically-suitable regions, some additional mechanism seems
required for triggering Wellsians’ temporal reversals. If such ‘looped’ regions tempo-
rally reverse their contents automatically, the process risks being involuntary (if not
de facto Gödelian) and restricted. In contrast, Wells’ (1895) Traveler can theoretically
visit all time and space.
An electrostatic puzzle remains to be addressed. If Wheeler–Feynman backward-
matter is antimatter, what prevents even neo-Cliffordian Wellsians suffering mutual
annihilation when their phases connect? Perhaps any requisite ‘warping’ should also
affect local time-direction, so rotating Wellsians hold constant orientation relative to
local space and time. But if warping means travelers also share time’s local (i.e. not
global) direction, any resulting travel is Gödelian, i.e. not Wellsian at all. However,
phases of hyper-rotating Wellsians meet only as unextended objects at instants and not
as extended objects over extended times. The mutual annihilation problem vanishes if
‘at-at’ temporal direction theories mean objects are strictly chargeless at any instant,
apex or otherwise. So ‘at-at’ temporal directionality means reversing Wellsians need
not become anti-matter, while neo-Cliffordian travel dissolves double occupancy.
11 Conclusions
Although such was perhaps not their aim, Grey (1999), Le Poidevin (2005) show con-
tinuous, controllable and survivable backward Wellsian travel can’t occur in strictly
Newtonian space. Newtonian spaces threaten time travelers with metaphysical, physi-
cal and biological challenges, including discontinuities, co-occupancy, Cheshire Cats,
chimeras, singularities and fluid-loss. These problems are no respecters of size—
Wellsian atoms face discontinuity/co-occupancy dilemmas as much as humans.
Some problems (e.g. discontinuity and co-occupancy) are mutually exclusive but
solving some generates others, (e.g. Cheshire Cat fades as solutions to co-occupancy).
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However, pace Grey (1999), Le Poidevin (2005), extended Wellsians can reverse tem-
poral direction, granted space has extra dimensions or (preferably) variable topology.
Wellsians fare best in warped space but do not require Gödelian ‘warped’ time. Hence
even if Gödel travel is not time travel, absolute time need not forbid time travel.
So time travel can occur even if Gödel travel is either impossible or not true time
travel. Physical objects can reverse in Newtonian time. While Clifford (1886) suggests
some spatial resources for Wellsians, Wellsians’ best bet are flexible ‘neo-Cliffordian’
worlds. In such worlds, time and space remain separate substances yet matter and space
can reciprocally affect each other and create local topological identifications. Unlike
Newtonian space, Wellsian (neo-Cliffordian) space must be mutable and curved. Hence
Newtonian space poses greater hazards for aspirant Wellsians than Newtonian time.
To enjoy unrestricted time-travel, Wellsians must be able to change space itself.
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